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The article takes its point of departure in the upcoming Iranian presidential election. The 
internal rift between the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad and the in many ways problematic Iranian national economy make the 
election challenging for the regime – regardless of the fact that due to the constitution 
Ahmadinejad cannot get reelected. The Iranian regime is on collision course with most 
regional players and with the US and the EU. The EU has launched a relatively far-reaching 
set of sanctions against Iran, which are aimed directly at Iran’s foreign trade, hereunder the 
oil and gas sector. The restrictive measures create serious problems for Iran, which – despite 
being one of the largest producers of oil and gas – radically needs modernization and 
investments in order to meet the domestic demand. It cannot be ruled out that we in 
connection with the upcoming presidential election will see demonstrations and unrest like 
in connection with the 2009 presidential election – and in the Arab world since early 2011. 
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Introduction 
A few months before the upcoming Iranian presidential election, which is going 
to take place 14 June 2013, many Iranians consider if it is worthwhile taking 
part in finding a successor to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has been president 
for two periods altogether lasting eight years and therefore cannot be reelected. 
The last Iranian presidential election in June 2009 was heavily criticized for 
fraud and manipulation and this is probably the most widespread reason why 
the Iranian electorate will think twice, before they show up at the polling 
stations (Tabaar, 2013, Kadivar, 2013). 
The election in Iran comes at a time, where the Iranian regime is under 
pressure. Internally Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has for a 
long time been on collision course with Ahmadinejad, whose ascendance to 
power was orchestrated by Khamenei in 2005 in order to stop the long lasting 
rift between the religious and the political leader and secure a loyal and 
stalwart supporter of the religious leader himself. Khamenei’s apparent backing 
of Ahmadinejad in the first years after 2005 demonstrated this in a very obvious 
way, but over time the pattern changed, not the least due to an increasingly 
independent president, who especially in his foreign policy rhetoric has 
presented the international audience for a radicalism beyond what Khamenei 
wanted. 
The question is if the election this time will produce a solid and 
uncontroversial political ally for the religious leader. Several conservative 
politicians have been mentioned as candidates for the election, among whom 
the parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani is meant to have a good chance, as are 
Tehran’s mayor, Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf and the secretary of Iran's 
Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili. 
First of all Khamenei wants to avoid a repetition of what happened in 1997, 
where the reform movement leader Mohammad Khatami was elected with an 
overwhelming majority against the “official” candidate, and maybe especially a 
situation like in 2009, where the widely criticized reelection of Ahmadinejad 
gave rise to the Green Movement and a massive wave of protests in Iran’s 
larger cities. In an attempt to block the influence of this movement two of its 
main leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi, both candidates of the 
2009 presidential election, have for long time been held in house arrest. 
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A main reason for the growing domestic dissatisfaction with the Iranian 
regime is the poor national economy. The to some degree isolated Iran is 
suffering from a low economic growth, which cannot keep up with the 
demands of the large population. The Iranians leaders are promoting the 
controversial nuclear programme not the least in order to compensate for an 
inefficient and poorly maintained oil production. Inflation has over the last year 
reduced the value of the wages for the Iranians causing trouble for the families 
in making ends meet. Added to that a plethora of deficiencies in public life like 
in Tehran the ageing and inefficient fleet of public transport, which encourages 
commuters to use their own – gasoline driven – means of transport, causing the 
pollution to rise to more than problematic levels (Behbudi, 2013). The situation 
contributes to the general feeling of discontent and frustration as the 
international sanctions against Iran contribute to the domestic economic 
difficulties and to the international isolation of Iran. 
 
The international sanctions with a focus on the EU restrictive measures 
The in many ways unfriendly relation between the EU and Iran goes at least 
back to the dramatic days in 1997 following the Mykonos-affair, where the EU 
countries withdrew their ambassadors to Iran claiming that the Iranian 
Intelligence Minister had ordered the killing of three Iranian-Kurdish 
opposition leaders in a restaurant in Berlin and that the Iranian leaders knew of 
this international scandal. The diplomatic crisis lasted until November 1997. 
Generally speaking, however, the relations between the EU and Iran improved 
after the election of the reform-oriented President Khatami. The EU wanted to 
encourage the newly elected moderate leaders in Iran and therefore in 1998 the 
EU revoked its ban on high-level ministerial contacts (2012). 
Khatami was in 2001 reelected for another four year period – a period 
which was marked by both the 9.11 attack in New York, the US War on Terror 
and the US-led invasion in Iraq in 2003. Maybe some of the reform-oriented 
Iranian leaders actually hoped that the US-war on terror, which started with 
fighting Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan, could open for better relations 
with the US. The hopes were frustrated; however, by President George W. 
Bush’s State of the Union address (29 January 2002), which connected Iran with 
Iraq and North Korea in an “axis of evil”. The Iranians, who had taken part in 
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bringing the new Hamid Karzai administration to power in Kabul and played 
an active role in a fundraising conference in Japan the same year with the 
purpose of providing funding for the new regime, were aggrieved, but 
probably any idea of a rapprochement disappeared in late 2002 with a growing 
belief in Iran, that following an invasion in Iraq which was anticipated in early 
2003 Iran would be put under mounting pressure.  
The expected invasion in Iraq came in March 2003 and took place at a time 
where the Bush administration became more and more convinced that Iran in 
all secrecy were trying to develop nuclear weapons. Gradually the IAEA came 
on collision course with Iran, which faced a dilemma. On one side compliance 
to the demands would lead to admitting to the US acquisitions, on the other 
side resistance to deal with the international nuclear regime might lead to 
further isolation. With the election in 2005 of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
a more confrontational approach was launched and from “late 2005 and into 
2006 the tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear issue escalated” (2012). In early 
2006 Iran removed the IAEA seals on its uranium enrichment facilities and 
declared that it would restart the programme. 
By March 2006 the EU declared the talks with Iran to be at a “dead end” 
and it is hardly an exaggeration to claim that this low developed into a 
situation, which became even worse. In April 2006 Ahmadinejad announced 
that Iran successfully had enriched uranium, yet mentioning that the 
production was not meant for nuclear weapons. The reaction from the EU came 
when Javier Solana on behalf of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) suggested limited sanctions against Iran, including visa bans on leading 
individuals.  
This reaction was later in 2006 followed by a proposal, according to which 
Iran was offered a package making it possible to maintain some enrichment 
activities by reaching agreements with the US, the EU, Russia and China on its 
nuclear programme. This time, however, Khamenei refused the proposal by 
referring to Irans “unalienable right to develop nuclear technology”. Thus the 
year of reelection for Ahmadinejad became at the same time a year, where the 
relation between Iran and IAEA got worse. The agency highlighted the 
continued refusal from the Iranian side to allow control visits to the nuclear 
facilities. 
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Gradually the EU’s restrictive measures vis-à-vis Iran have been added 
new dimensions. The list of the recent sanctions as shown at the European 
Commission homepages comprises a variety of measures from sanctions 
directed against individuals (travel bans, freezing of funds and economic 
resources), restrictions on sale of important equipment for trade and transport, 
IT-hard- and software, and more general bans on Iranian products, most 
significant of course crude oil and petroleum products (EU-Commission, 2012). 
Iran has to some degree become a test case for the CFSP – in the case of Iran 
under the directorship of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the EU3) 
– as claimed by Shirin Pakfar (Pakfar, 2011).  
However, if the idea is to pressure Iran to accept the demands from the 
IAEA, the test so far has failed, to put it simple. As an answer to the EU import 
bans Iran threatened to mine the Straits of Hormuz in order to prevent the 
transport of oil and gas. This led to responses from the US, who deployed a 
number of naval vessels in the area – a measure which hardly is an option for 
the EU. There is hardly any doubt that the sanctions work, but still no progress 
can be seen in the Iranian willingness to live up to the demands, as mentioned 
in the most recent EU Council assessment of the situation , where it is stated 
that “The EU has urged Iran to take concrete and practical steps aimed at 
building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear 
programme” (but the EU…) regrets that Iran has not yet given formal 
agreement to the structured approach document, discussed with the IAEA on 8 
June 2012” (Council, 2012).  
Despite self-confident pledges that Iran will withstand international 
pressure, the economic isolation takes its toll and leads to stagnation and 
attempts at emigration. The EU sanctions aimed directly at Iran’s foreign trade, 
financial services and the oil and gas sector is a serious problem for Iran, which 
– despite being one of the largest producers of oil and gas – radically needs 
modernization and investments in order to meet the domestic demand. The 
nuclear power facilities under construction can in the nature of the case not 
compensate for that. According to an EU Council Press Announcement in 
December 2012 further restrictive measures were added, raising the numbers so 
that entities and persons subject to sanctions are 490 and 105, respectively. 
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Regional perspectives 
For the leaders in Iran the situation is problematic. The country is heading for 
the upcoming presidential election in a state of international isolation, domestic 
economic problems and potential internal turmoil. The Iranian electorate can on 
one side choose to stay home in fear of repression and (understandable) apathy. 
On the other side it can choose to take part in an election, where no real 
alternative to the regime are allowed to share the vote. Despite the harsh 
repression it seems unlikely that the Iranian voters will skip the chance to 
demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the conservative religious leadership, and 
it can certainly not be ruled out that we again will see demonstrations and 
unrest like in 2009. 
Recent developments in the Middle East have strengthened Iran’s 
opponents in the MENA-region, not the least the Gulf-states, which only to a 
moderate degree have been affected by the Arab revolts. The “traditional” 
alliance between Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas (Samii, 2008) appears 
weakened, first of all because of the tragic situation in Syria, making it more 
and more difficult to uphold a strong strategic relationship with the regime in 
Damascus. And the disastrous development in Syria is not only weakening 
Iran, but is also leaving the strong non-state actors Hezbollah and Hamas in a 
relatively marginalized situation, thereby indirectly weakening Iran. 
The regime is on collision course with the other regional players and with 
the US and the EU. The EU which in relation to Syria has gone relatively far in 
tightening its sanctions (Seeberg, 2012) has, as shown, launched a relatively far-
reaching set of sanctions against Iran as well. At the rhetorical level it seems not 
to affect either Khamenei or Ahmadinejad. Most probably, however, the 
difficult situation adds to the obvious rift between them – which is one of the 
very good reasons to follow the upcoming Iranian presidential election closely. 
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